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Abstract
Theories of embodied cognition suggest that conceptual processing relies on the same neural resources that are utilized for
perception and action. Evidence for these perceptual simulations comes from neuroimaging and behavioural research, such
as demonstrations of somatotopic motor cortex activations following the presentation of action-related words, or
facilitation of grasp responses following presentation of object names. However, the interpretation of such effects has been
called into question by suggestions that neural activation in modality-specific sensorimotor regions may be epiphenomenal,
and merely the result of spreading activations from ‘‘disembodied’’, abstracted, symbolic representations. Here, we present
two studies that focus on the perceptual modalities of touch and proprioception. We show that in a timed object-
comparison task, concurrent tactile or proprioceptive stimulation to the hands facilitates conceptual processing relative to
control stimulation. This facilitation occurs only for small, manipulable objects, where tactile and proprioceptive information
form part of the multimodal perceptual experience of interacting with such objects, but facilitation is not observed for large,
nonmanipulable objects where such perceptual information is uninformative. Importantly, these facilitation effects are
independent of motor and action planning, and indicate that modality-specific perceptual information plays a functionally
constitutive role in our mental representations of objects, which supports embodied assumptions that concepts are
grounded in the same neural systems that govern perception and action.
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Introduction
How do we conceive of the world around us? How do we
understand linguistic statements about the world? How do we
represent objects that are not right in front of our eyes? The
question of what constitutes the content of mental representations
has long-exercised psychologists and philosophers alike. Extending
the views of the British empiricist philosophers (e.g., Hume, Locke,
Berkeley), theories of embodied cognition assume that the neural
systems we use for conceptual thought (i.e., language processing,
problem solving etc.) are grounded in the same neural systems that
we use for perception and action [1–5]. Reading the words
‘‘cinnamon’’ or‘‘yellow’’, forexample,leads toincreased activations
in the same modality-specific neural subsystems engaged when we
physically perceive cinnamon or yellowness through our senses of
smell and vision [6,7]. In essence, successfully understanding these
words entails partially re-enacting, or perceptually simulating, our
prior bodily experiences of cinnamon and yellow.
A growing body of behavioral and neurophysiological evidence
supports the notion that conceptual processing engages modality-
specific systems (e.g., visual, auditory, motor) and that people
automatically simulate perceptual information even when it is
superfluous to task requirements [1,2]. It has been demonstrated
that, when people read sentences, they automatically represent
perceptual information of mentioned objects such as their shape,
color, orientation and motion [8–12]. For example, following the
sentence ‘‘John put the pencil in the drawer’’ people are faster to
recognize the image of a pencil that is subsequently presented in a
horizontal orientation onscreen, compared to a pencil that is
presented with a vertical orientation. The opposite pattern is found
following the sentence ‘‘John put the pencil in the cup’’, which
implies a vertical orientation. From an embodied cognition
viewpoint, the reader has perceptually simulated the event in the
sentence and so their mental pencil is automatically oriented in a
situation-appropriate fashion, thereby facilitating recognition of
the object with a matching orientation.
Further to the representation of modality-specific object
properties, others have demonstrated action-sentence compatibil-
ity effects, where the direction of movement implied by a sentence
(e.g., ‘‘You handed John the book’’), facilitates a congruent body
movement (e.g., moving the hand away from the body: [13]).
Because the sentence implies movement of the arm, simulating this
event leads to effector-specific activations in the motor cortex,
which results in faster arm movements in the congruent direction.
Such behavioral findings relating to action semantics have been
bolstered by findings using neuroimaging techniques. For
example, in response to reading action verbs related to different
bodily effectors (e.g., lick, pick, kick), somatotopic activations in the
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activations happen so rapidly (,200 ms: [16,17]) that many have
argued that modality-specific perceptual and motor information
fundamentally constitutes conceptual content, and therefore plays
a functional role in conceptual representations [16–18].
Of late, however, a serious challenge has been presented to
embodied views of cognition. Several theorists have argued that
the patterns of data described above do not support the conclusion
that modality-specific perceptual information is constitutive, or
functionally required, for the representation of conceptual content
[19–22]. Instead, it is suggested that any activation in modality-
specific brain areas may be nothing more than epiphenomenal;
merely reflecting downstream neural activity following initial
activation of amodal, abstracted or ‘‘disembodied’’ symbols . For
example, any increased neural activation that is observed in the
hand area of the pre-motor cortex following the reading of the
word ‘‘pick’’ could be the result of spreading activation stemming
from prior activation of an amodal symbol of the concept [PICK],
with subsequent activations cascading into the motor system.
Similarly, representing the appropriate shape or orientation of an
object could be achieved by first activating an amodal symbol
[PENCIL], which in turn triggers activation in modality-specific
areas relating to the relevant object properties. The argument is
that behavioral evidence of perceptual simulation or neural
activations in sensorimotor and modality-specific brain areas that
occur subsequent to the presentation of linguistic stimuli may be
explicable by initial activations of amodal or disembodied symbols.
In this way, the modality-specific and sensorimotor activations
may not be functionally required for conceptual content, simply
serving as supplementary activations to the core amodal concept.
Here, we propose an alternative approach to answering the
question of whether modality-specific perceptual information
functionally constitutive of conceptual representations. Much of
the evidence in support of embodied representations has emerged
from research focussing on motor responses to action-related
words and sentences [23–28]. For example, people are faster to
respond to named objects when their hand posture on an
experimental prop matches the grasp aperture afforded by the
object (e.g., power grip for ‘‘apple’’, precision grip for ‘‘grape’’:
[29]). However, as well as being open to the aforementioned
criticisms of downstream activation, this approach conflates motor
information with perceptual information, and, crucially, leaves
open the possibility that observed effects may be due in part to
planning and executing a motor response with the relevant
effector. In the present study, we focussed instead on the
modalities of touch and proprioception, and tested whether
perceptual information from these modalities does indeed play a
functional, constitutive role in conceptual representations. We
used a behavioral paradigm where participants received concur-
rent perceptual stimulation while completing a conceptual task in
order to determine whether such perceptual stimulation impacts
on conceptual processing in a manner consistent with embodied
views of cognition, but inconsistent with ‘‘disembodied’’ views of
cognition. As a conceptual task, participants made semantic
judgements of object size comparison, where they decided which
was the bigger or smaller object of a pair of named objects. Our
approach separated tactile and proprioceptive representations
from action planning by measuring the speed of participant voice
responses (where the mouth is a non-relevant effector for the
objects being judged), which obviated the need for responses that
required overt actions using object-relevant effectors.
While people can retrieve visual information about the size of
objects [30–34]), another source of information about object size
comes from physical interaction; the arms, hands and fingers feed
back tactile and proprioceptive information when contact is made
with an object. Embodied cognition views argue that this kind of
body-specific information plays an important functional role in
conceptually representing objects because cognition is grounded in
the same neural systems that govern perception and action. For
example, in order to decide whether a wallet or a key is bigger, a
strong interpretation of such theories would assume that past
experiences across various modalities – visual, motor, tactile,
proprioceptive, etc. – will be partially re-enacted, and the resulting
simulations of wallet and key will then be compared. Simulating
non-visual information, however, depends on being able to
interact physically with the object in question. While a wallet or
key can be picked up and spanned by the hands, a mansion or a
cottage cannot offer the same opportunities for tactile and
proprioceptive interactions. Thus, from an embodied perspective,
providing concurrent tactile and proprioceptive stimulation should
influence conceptual processing of manipulable objects only, but in
what way?
Previous work has shown that bodily feedback can facilitate
cognitive processing by directing attentional resources to relevant
neural systems. For example, when the mouth is unconsciously
pulled into a smiling expression by holding a pen between the
teeth, people find cartoons funnier [35] and are quicker to
understand sentences that describe pleasant or happy situations
(e.g., You and your lover embrace after a long separation: [36]; see also
[37–39] for examples of how facial immobilisation can interfere
with processing such stimuli). Similarly, slumping in a chair makes
it easier for people to retrieve sad or negative memories [40,41],
while lying down speeds up people’s recall of visiting the dentist
[42]. Even at a modality-specific level, perceptual primes have
been shown to facilitate simulation in that modality [43],
providing attentional demands in that modality are not too high
[44]. Based on such work, we expected bodily feedback from touch
and arm/hand positioning to direct attention to the modality in
question (i.e., touch and proprioception) and hence facilitate the
speed of simulating conceptual information in those modalities.
Accordingly, we applied tactile or proprioceptive stimulation
either to the hands as critical object-relevant feedback, or to the
feet as control object-irrelevant feedback, while people judged
pairs of objects that were either small and manipulable or large
and nonmanipulable. Since the simulations formed during
conceptual processing should be based on experience in all
relevant modalities, we predicted that people would be faster to
make conceptual size comparisons during tactile and propriocep-
tive stimulation, but that such facilitation would be limited to (a)
stimulation of the hands, and (b) objects of a physically
manipulable size. By contrast, a disembodied view would predict
that providing sensorimotor inputs concurrently with conceptual
processing will either have no impact on conceptual processing or
will impact only generally on processing (i.e., with a general
facilitatory or inhibitory effect), but with no differential effects on
the processing of manipulable and nonmanipulable objects.
In the first experiment, people performed the size comparison
task while receiving tactile stimulation from vibrating cushions. By
resting hands on cushions, participants also received constant
proprioceptive stimulation to the hands and arms in both critical
and control conditions. However, in the critical condition, where
the hand cushions were vibrating, participants experienced
vibrotactile feedback [45] to the skin on palm and fingers which
was absent during the control condition (see Figure 1 for a
schematic of the conditions). In the second experiment, we
manipulated proprioceptive information by having participants
passively hold an object (i.e., an inflated beachball) while they
performed the object size comparison task. Here, participants
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and control conditions (i.e., skin on palm and fingers was in
continuous lightly-pressured contact with a flat surface). Crucially,
holding a lightweight beachball in the critical condition meant that
participants received isometric proprioceptive feedback from the
hands and arms (i.e., stable muscular tension during passive
holding, without change in the length of muscle fibers), which was
absent during the control condition. In both experiments, hand-
and foot-stimulation took place in two counterbalanced blocks.
The pairs of objects being compared were either both manipulable
(i.e., of small size and can be held in one hand, such as wallet, key,
coin) or both nonmanipulable (i.e. of large size and greater than
arms’ width, such as mansion, car, cottage).
Results
Results are presented graphically in Figure 2A–D, with response
times and accuracy per condition reported in Table 1. Overall,
findings from linear mixed model analyses were as predicted.
Relative to foot-stimulation controls, perceptually stimulating the
hands facilitated participants’ judgements for manipulable objects
alone [tactile hand M=1459 ms, SE=47 ms; tactile foot
M=1528 ms, SE=47 ms: F(1, 3520.1)=18.39, p,.0001,
r=.072; proprioceptive hand M=1533 ms, SE=48 ms; proprio-
ceptive foot M=1612 ms, SE=48 ms: F(1, 3795.2)=22.06,
p,.0001, r=.076]. By contrast, neither tactile nor proprioceptive
stimulation influenced the processing of nonmanipulable objects
(tactile hand M=1576 ms, SE=47 ms; tactile foot M=1595 ms,
SE=47 ms: p=.243; proprioceptive hand M=1641 ms,
SE=48 ms; proprioceptive foot M=1624 ms, SE=47 ms:
p=.326).
Effects were robust regardless of the direction of the object
comparison. For tactile stimulation, critical facilitation for
manipulable objects emerged both when participants judged
which object was bigger (Figure 2A): F(1, 3509.2)=10.88, p=.001,
r=.056; and which object was smaller (Figure 2B): F(1,
3528.7)=7.65, p=.006., r=.047. Neither bigger nor smaller
judgements showed any difference for nonmanipulable objects,
p=.276 and p=.580, respectively. An identical pattern emerged
for proprioceptive stimulation, with facilitated processing of
manipulable objects for both ‘‘which is bigger’’ (Figure 2C): F(1,
3791.9)=12.27, p,.001, r=.057; and ‘‘which is smaller’’
comparisons (Figure 2D): F(1, 3794.0)=9.94, p=.002, r=.051;
but no facilitation for nonmanipulable objects, ‘‘bigger’’ judge-
ments (p=.990); ‘‘smaller’’ judgements, (p=.172).
Overall, people responded more quickly during stimulation to
the hands than stimulation to the feet [tactile F(1, 3519.9)=14.67,
Figure 1. Schematic of perceptual stimulation to the hands
(critical condition) or feet (control condition), showing partic-
ipant receiving tactile stimulation from vibrating cushions, or
proprioceptive stimulation from holding a 30 cm diameter
beachball.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033321.g001
Figure 2. Size judgement effects (in ms) for tactile stimulation
(a: bigger judgements; N=20, b: smaller judgements; N=21)
and proprioceptive stimulation (c: bigger judgements; N=23,
d: smaller judgements; N=22), showing consistent facilitation
for small, manipulable objects but not for large, nonmanipul-
able objects. RT difference was calculated by subtracting judgement
times in the control foot-stimulation condition from judgement times in
the critical hand-stimulation condition. Error bars show 95% confidence
intervals of the difference between means.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033321.g002
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r=.042], and manipulable objects were judged faster than
nonmanipulable [tactile F(1, 96.1)=7.54, p=.007, r=.270;
proprioceptive F(1, 97.7)=3.03, p=.085, r=.173], with the
critical size by position interaction emerging under both
stimulation modalities [tactile F(1, 3519.7)=4.66, p=.031,
r=.036; proprioceptive F(1, 3795.6)=15.95, p,.0001, r=.065].
Judgement type had no main effect (tactile p=.455; proprioceptive
p=.146), but did interact with object size [tactile F(1,
3510.4)=18.67, p,.0001, r=.073; proprioceptive F(1,
3790.6)=29.25, p,.0001, r=.088] because ‘‘which is smaller’’
judgements were generally faster for manipulable objects than
nonmanipulable, while ‘‘which is bigger’’ judgements made little
difference. There were no other interactions, all ps..4.
Combined analysis of both experiments revealed similar effect
sizes for both tactile and proprioceptive stimulation: the critical
interaction (size by position) does not in itself interact with
stimulation modality (i.e., touch, proprioception), F(1,
7403.1)=2.23, p=.136, nor does it produce a four-way
interaction with stimulation modality and judgement type (i.e.,
bigger, smaller comparisons), p..2.
Discussion
We found that stimulating the hands with tactile vibrations or
proprioceptive isometric positioning made it easier for participants
to compare small, manipulable objects like coins or frisbees. Objects
that were too large to be physically manipulable, like cars and
windmills, were unaffected by either tactile or proprioceptive
stimulation. These findings support the idea that size representa-
tions of manipulable objects include modality-specific information
about touch and position that specifically relate to the hands,
whereas size representations of nonmanipulable objects lack such
information. This modality-specific, body-specific facilitation effect
was independent of the direction of the size comparison. While
there has been some agreement that object size representations
have a strong visual component, distinct from amodal proposi-
tional representations such as [size:5 cm] or [size:huge], with
evidence coming from numerous behavioral and neuroimaging
studies [30–34,46–48], the current findings of distinct tactile and
proprioceptive effects on size comparisons provides the first
evidence that the senses of touch and proprioception uniquely
and separably contribute to object representations. Furthermore,
by requiring vocal responses, they confirm that tactile and
proprioceptive object representations are independent of planning
an associated action with a relevant effector. In short, this study
shows that modality-specific tactile and proprioceptive perceptual
information has a functionally constitutive role to play in the
conceptual representation of objects that is consistent with body-
specific experience of such objects. The pattern of results is difficult
to square with an account that requires the initial activation of an
amodal symbolic representation, with only downstream, incidental
activation of perceptual information. We return to this point
below.
The issue remains as to what mechanism allows for such
facilitation effects. The answer to this question lies in the nature of
the representations we construct for objects in the world. From an
embodied or grounded cognition perspective, it is through our
situation-specific interactions with objects themselves that we build
up their representations. Crucially, these representations include
the modality-specific information that is perceived during
experience (e.g., [49,50]). So, holding a cup will stimulate, for
example, visual, tactile and proprioceptive senses, leading to
activation of a particular set of cell assemblies, or network of
distributed neural representations, all of which constitute the cup’s
percept. Through Hebbian learning, these cell assemblies become
associated with a verbal code (i.e., the word ‘‘cup’’) which co-
occurs over time with these perceptual activations [51,52]. This set
of multimodal activations is then re-activated, or simulated
[1,2,53–55] during conceptual tasks such as size comparisons,
property-verifications or sentence comprehension. In the present
studies, the provision of tactile or proprioceptive stimulation to the
hands means that cell assemblies associated with small, manipu-
lable objects like cups are already partly activated due to a partial
overlap between their activations and the concurrent sensory
input. Thus, some of the modality-specific information that is
needed to perform the perceptual simulation of the objects in the
size-comparison task has already been activated. In other words,
holding a beachball leads to a patterns of neural activation that
overlaps with the proprioceptive simulation of a small, manipu-
lable object, and it is this overlapping activation that leads to
facilitation in judging that object’s size. As larger objects do not
afford such physical interactions, they provide little or no
proprioceptive information during perception. During conceptual
tasks, therefore, providing proprioceptive stimulation cannot
Table 1. Mean response times (ms) and accuracy levels (%), with standard errors in parentheses, for all factor combinations in both
tactile and proprioceptive stimulation experiments.
Tactile stimulation Proprioceptive stimulation
Judgement
type Object size Stimulation position RT Accuracy RT Accuracy
Bigger Manipulable Hands 1450 (64) 97.8 (1.1) 1504 (63) 95.6 (1.2)
Feet 1525 (64) 97.1 (1.3) 1587 (63) 95.4 (1.6)
Nonmanipulable Hands 1517 (64) 90.9 (1.6) 1540 (63) 88.9 (1.6)
Feet 1543 (64) 89.9 (1.9) 1540 (63) 90.5 (1.6)
Smaller Manipulable Hands 1468 (63) 94.9 (1.1) 1561 (64) 94.8 (1.2)
Feet 1531 (62) 96.1 (1.2) 1638 (64) 92.8 (1.6)
Nonmanipulable Hands 1635 (63) 92.5 (1.6) 1742 (64) 92.7 (1.7)
Feet 1647 (63) 91.5 (1.9) 1708 (64) 91.4 (1.7)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033321.t001
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manipulable objects.
Returning to the key issue of whether these results can be
explained by a downstream activation mechanism cascading from
an amodal or abstracted symbolic representation, one could
assume that there is an amodal symbol for ‘‘cup’’ and we find that,
due to tactile stimulation to the hands, a person’s conceptual
processing related to ‘‘cup’’ is facilitated. One could argue that the
tactile stimulation merely increases speed of access to an abstract
symbol in the conceptual task, which is subsequently manifested in
faster response times. However, this argument can only work if the
same tactile sensory stimulation leads to equivalent facilitation of
amodal symbols for all object types (i.e., both manipulable and
nonmanipulable objects), but this is not what happens. Small,
manipulable objects are differentially affected relative to large,
nonmanipulable items. An amodal symbol for ‘‘cup’’ cannot
encode these differences without the inclusion of perceptual
information related to the object’s size properties. To achieve such
a distinction, a committed amodalist could propose a hybrid of
downstream and upstream activation, where stimulation to the
hands preferentially spreads activation upstream to a symbol for
‘‘manipulable’’, which in turn spreads activation to the symbols for
all manipulable objects, thus meeting the downstream activation of
the symbol for ‘‘cup’’ when the word is presented onscreen.
However, this argument founders with closer inspection of the
results. People were faster to make ‘‘which is smaller’’ judgements
about manipulable objects than nonmanipulable objects, while this
difference did not occur for ‘‘which is bigger’’ judgements (i.e.,
judgement type interacted with object size in both tactile and
proprioceptive studies). In amodal terms, this effect equates to a
close relationship between a ‘‘small’’ symbol (activated by the
relevant judgement task) and a ‘‘manipulable’’ symbol (activated
by hand stimulation), whereas an equivalent ‘‘big’’ symbol
(activated by the relevant judgement task) has no such relationship
with ‘‘manipulable’’. If hand stimulation preferentially activated a
‘‘manipulable’’ symbol in a way that foot stimulation did not, one
would therefore expect such hand stimulation to mediate the
relationship between ‘‘small’’ and ‘‘manipulable’’ symbols (but to
have little effect on the nonexistant relationship between ‘‘big’’ and
‘‘manipulable’’). No such effect occurred (i.e., there is no three-
way interaction between judgement type, object size and
stimulation position in either study). Finally, one could argue that
asking participants ‘‘which is smaller’’ activated an amodal symbol
for ‘‘small’’, which in turn spread activation to a range of related
symbols for manipulable objects and thus facilitated their
processing. Again, this argument founders with examination of
the results: the critical facilitation effect means that manipulable
objects were only processed more quickly when the participant’s
hands (as opposed to their feet) were perceptually stimulated.
Furthermore, the same facilitation effect occurred regardless of
comparison direction: it did not matter whether participants were
judging which object was bigger or smaller. Thus, potential
symbolic associations between the stimulation position/judgement
task and items cannot account for the pattern of results. An
alternative view is that the object representation comprises
perceptual information relating to the physical, perceptual
properties of the object. In short, modality-specific perceptual
activations play a functional role in conceptual representation, and
do not simply serve as epiphenomenal supplements to a core
amodal concept.
We have previously shown that modality-specific perceptual
information is automatically represented in conceptual processing
of words relating to touch, vision, taste, smell and hearing [49,56].
Other studies have shown various modality-specific effects for the
same set of five basic senses (e.g., [8,9,43,50,57,58]). The present
work is the first demonstration that proprioception can be added
to the list of automatically-represented perceptual modalities in
conceptual tasks, such as the size-comparison task employed here.
The knowledge that perceptual information informs our concep-
tual representations across a range of modalities, and that sensorial
feedback impacts on these representations, will play a crucial role
in the further development of embodied theories of cognition.
Moreover, because of the tight coupling between the perceptual
and conceptual systems, it is possible that linguistic and other
conceptual tasks may be beneficial in developing novel, non-
invasive therapeutic approaches (e.g., [59,60]) for treating
perceptual and sensorimotor deficits, such as in stroke rehabilita-
tion [61].
In conclusion, the present findings enhance our understanding
of embodied conceptual representations, demonstrating that
people can ‘‘hold’’ something in the mind’s hands by simulating
modality-specific information captured during perceptual experi-
ence. Furthermore, while vision is a useful and fundamental means
of perceiving and representing objects, the importance of bodily
feedback provided by touch and proprioception should not be
underestimated as they offer valuable means of conceptualizing
the world around us. The current pattern of results is not
consistent with a disembodied view of conceptual representations
that confines perceptual information to an epiphenomenal role.
Rather, it seems that modality-specific, perceptually grounded
representations that are functionally constitutive of conceptual
content are needed to explain the relationship between perceptual
stimulation, bodily feedback and conceptual activation.
Materials and Methods
Participants
The studies were approved by the Research Ethics Committee
of the School of Psychological Sciences, University of Manchester
and conform to the principles outlined in the Declaration of
Helsinki. For each study, participants gave written informed
consent prior to participation. Eighty-six volunteers from the
University of Manchester took part for course credit or a £3
reward. Forty-one participants (23 female, 18 male; Mean
age=23.1 years) completed the tactile stimulation task (bigger
judgements N=20, smaller judgements N=21; see procedure for
details), while forty-five (26 female, 19 male; Mean age=22.9
years) completed the proprioception stimulation task (bigger
judgements N=23, smaller judgements N=22). All participants
were naı ¨ve to the experiment, had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, were fluent in English, and had no mobility or reading
impairments.
Materials
Stimuli for the size comparison task consisted of 100 pairs of
object names: 50 pairs of small-size, manipulable objects (e.g.,
COIN:FRISBEE, ALMOND:PEAR, CRAYON:PEN) and 50
pairs of large-size, nonmanipulable objects (e.g., CAR:VAN,
CAMEL:COW, MANSION:COTTAGE). Both items in each
pair were from the same category (both buildings, both fruits, both
artifacts, etc.) with one object in each pair bigger than the other. In
a pretest, three independent raters correctly classified the larger/
smaller item of each pair in 100% of cases. There were no
differences in word length between bigger and smaller items in
each pair, nor between big and small items in general (ps..3).
Four counterbalanced lists of stimuli were created (each with 25
small and 25 large pairs), to ensure that all items would appear in
both the hand- and foot-stimulation blocks, as well as appearing on
Perceptual Knowledge in Conceptual Representations
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 March 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 3 | e33321both the left- and right-hand positions onscreen. This counterbal-
ancing ensures that all items appear in all conditions.
In order to ensure our manipulation was not confounded by
lexical associations, we calculated the conditional probability of
encountering each object name given the name of the body part
stimulated for that block. For example, using the Web 1T 5-gram
corpus [62], which consists of over a trillion words culled from
Google indices, the frequency of ‘‘hand’’ and ‘‘coin’’ was obtained
when zero to three words occurred between them, and then
divided by the frequency of the word ‘‘hand’’. Analysis of variance
showed that the word ‘‘hand’’ was marginally more related to all
object names than the word ‘‘foot’’, F(1, 198)=2.84, p=.093,
r=.119, but there was no interaction with object size (p=.768),
and no effect of object size itself (p=.448). In other words, ‘‘hand’’
was just as likely to predict the names of manipulable objects
(M=0.013%) as nonmanipulable objects (M=0.018%), as was
‘‘foot’’ (M=0.007% and M=0.010%, respectively), and so lexical
priming could not give rise to our predicted pattern of effects.
Procedures
In the tactile stimulation paradigm, participants removed their
shoes and sat in a chair in front of a computer screen. The
experimenter then placed a massage cushion under each hand and
foot (see Figure 1) and participants remained in this position for
the duration of the experiment. The hand cushions vibrated to
provide tactile stimulation in the critical block, while the foot
cushions vibrated to provide equivalent sensory distraction in the
control block. While vibration can sometimes affect propriocep-
tion, the vibrotactile apparatus in the present experiment was
unlikely to do so both because the vibration frequency (67 Hz) was
below that at which Pacinian corpuscles (cutaneous sensory
receptors that have been found to contribute to proprioception:
see e.g., [63]) consistently respond, and because vibration in the
present study was not applied directly over tendons in the elbow or
ankle in order to vibrate muscle spindles (and thus create
proprioceptive illusions of movement: e.g., [64,65]) but rather
was applied to the glabrous skin of the hand and foot. In the
proprioception stimulation paradigm, participants also sat in front
of a computer screen, but in the hand stimulation condition
participants held a beachball of 30 cm diameter in front of their
bodies at chest height, without letting the ball touch their knees or
the table in front, which positioned their hands a constant distance
apart (see Figure 1). Squares of stiff card were attached to both
sides of the beachball, and participants placed their hands flat on
the card, secured by rubber finger loops, to prevent the curvature
of the ball providing unwanted shape information. The feet were
kept flat on the ground for the duration of the block. In the foot
stimulation (control) block, participants held the beachball
between their lower legs, as far down as possible without letting
the ball touch the ground. The hands were placed flat on the
thighs, with arms relaxed, for the duration of this block. Holding
the beachball, rather than simply holding hands/feet apart in
isolation, ensured that participants kept their hands/feet at a stable
distance apart for the duration of the experiment and meant that
participants received isometric proprioceptive feedback (i.e., stable
muscular tension during passive holding, without change in the
length of muscle fibers) from the hands and arms, which is absent
during the control condition.
For the size comparison task, each pair of object names was
presented in capital letters, 4 cm apart in the center of the screen
(left-right order counterbalanced), separated by a colon. Once a
vocal response had registered, the screen blanked for 1500 ms
before the next trial. Participants received automatic feedback if
their responses were outside the valid range (250–3000 ms). Trials
were randomly presented within each block, with different
randomizations for each participant. Since size comparison is
bidirectional, participants were randomly allocated to make either
bigger or smaller judgements. In other words, Participant A would
always judge which object of a pair was bigger, while Participant B
would always judge which object was smaller. Participants were
told they would see the names of two objects onscreen and that
they should state aloud, as quickly as possible, which item was
bigger (or smaller) in size. If participants were unfamiliar with any
presented words, they were asked to say so and the trial was
marked as invalid. To record responses, participants wore a head-
mounted unidirectional microphone. Response times were mea-
sured from the appearance of the object names to the onset of the
vocal response. Any trials where disfluencies (e.g., coughs,
hesitancies) triggered the microphone were marked as invalid. A
practice session of ten trials preceded the main experiment to
familiarize participants with the task and allow for microphone
calibration.
Design & Analysis
Response time data in valid trials were analyzed separately for
tactile and proprioceptive studies using linear mixed models,
which allows simultaneous analysis with participants and items as
crossed random factors [66,67]. Crossed fixed factors were object
size (manipulable, nonmanipulable) and stimulation position
(hands, feet) as within-participant manipulations, and judgement
type (bigger, smaller) as between participants. All condition means
presented in the text are estimated marginal means in millisec-
onds, and effect size r is calculated from F (where numerator
df=1) as per t [68]. Response times that were greater than 2.5
standard deviations from a participant’s mean per condition were
classed as outliers and removed prior to analysis. This resulted in a
loss of 2.47% from the tactile study and 2.72% from the
proprioception study.
Accuracy levels were high and no participants were excluded
due to low accuracy scores. There was no evidence of speed-
accuracy tradeoff. Analysis of mean accuracy per participant
showed that manipulable objects were processed more accurately
than nonmanipulable ones (tactile manipulable M=96%, non-
manipulable M=91%, F(1, 39)=40.23, p,.0001, r=.713;
proprioceptive manipulable M=95%, nonmanipulable
M=91%, F(1, 43)=28.49, p,.0001, r=.631), and this effect did
not vary by hand/foot stimulation (tactile p=.418; proprioceptive
p=.368).
Debriefing
On completion of the task, participants were asked whether they
thought they understood the purpose of the study. In no case did a
participant mention anything about object representations or
perceptual information, nor did any participant suspect the true
reason for the tactile or proprioceptive manipulations.
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